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ABSTRACT 
NASA’s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in 
Florida on October 28, 2009. To obtain approval for launch, a range safety final flight data 
package was generated to meet the data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command 
Manual 91-710 Volume 2. The delivery included products such as a nominal trajectory, trajectory 
envelopes, stage disposal data and footprints, and a malfunction turn analysis. The Air Force’s 
45th Space Wing uses these products to ensure public and launch area safety. Due to the 
criticality of these data, an independent validation and verification effort was undertaken to ensure 
data quality and adherence to requirements. As a result, the product package was delivered with 
the confidence that independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data 
to meet the range requirements and yielded consistent results. This document captures Ares I-X 
final flight data package verification and validation analysis, including the methodology used to 
validate and verify simulation inputs, execution, and results and presents lessons learned during 
the process.  
INTRODUCTION 
At Cape Canaveral, Air Force Range Safety Mission Flight Control Officers (MFCOs) 
monitor each launch vehicle’s real-time ascent trajectory from an Eastern Range (ER) launch site 
with Range Safety (RS) displays. The Air Force’s 45th Space Wing (45SW) calculates the public 
safety risk of each flight and generates flight rules, launch commit criteria, and displays, which 
provide information required by the MFCO to protect the critical geographic areas and population 
centers that are defined prior to launch. Some of the input data required by the range to provide 
range safety support are mission specific RS products described in the Air Force Space 
Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710 requirements document. These data requirements must 
be met by the range user in order to obtain flight plan approval for a launch from a 45SW-
operated launch pad. Due to the critical safety aspect involved with protecting the public, it is 
imperative that the RS products be correct and timely. Consequences of incorrect data could 
include a launch delay, risk to people/facilities on the ground, or unintended flight termination.  
 
  
 
SCOPE OF WORK 
The Ares I-X Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office, located at Langley 
Research Center (LaRC), worked with teams at Johnson Space Center (JSC), Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC), Aerospace Corporation in Los Angeles, and the 45SW in the development 
of the RS products discussed in this paper. The RS products discussed herein were developed 
using six degree-of-freedom (6DOF) flight simulations and were verified by teams at JSC, MSFC, 
and Aerospace Corporation. Table 1 lists the prime generation and verification teams for the Ares 
I-X RS products. In addition to the direct product support teams, the Launch Constellation Range 
Safety Panel (LCRSP) and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group (RSTWG) provided 
direction and review. The 45SW was involved in the RSTWG throughout the generation and IV&V 
process ensuring the RS product package successfully met all requirements. 
Table 1 Ares I-X Roles and Responsibilities 
Product Prime IV&V 
Nominal Ascent Trajectory LaRC JSC, MSFC 
Ascent Flight Envelope Data LaRC MSFC 
Malfunction Turn Data LaRC JSC 
First Stage Disposal Footprint LaRC Aerospace Corporation 
 
The nominal trajectory is the undispersed, no-fail trajectory predicted to be representative 
of day-of-launch conditions. The ascent flight envelopes define the trajectory positional 
downrange and uprange boundaries defined by predicted environmental and systems 
dispersions. The malfunction turn analysis describes the off-nominal trajectories that may result 
from a single system failure. The first stage (FS) disposal impact footprint encompasses impact 
locations resulting from FS reentries with system and environmental dispersions. Please refer to 
the papers listed in the references section for detail on each of these products. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Ares I-X project employed an independent verification and validation (IV&V) process 
for the Final Flight Data Package (FFDP) to ensure the proper products were developed and the 
products delivered were accurate to the greatest extent possible and free of errors. This paper 
describes the IV&V efforts undertaken for the following RS products: nominal ascent trajectory, 
ascent flight envelopes, malfunction turn data and analysis, and stage disposal footprint. The 
Ares I-X RS product analysis, strengthened by the rigor of the IV&V effort, produced vehicle 
trajectory data that was on-time and error free, contributing to the successful launch of Ares I-X.  
VALIDATION 
Validation of the FFDP data product was achieved through the work of the RSTWG. The 
RSTWG consisted of personnel from Ares I-X System Engineering and Integration (SE&I) 
trajectory team (at LaRC), Johnson Space Center’s range safety and probabilistic risk 
assessment teams, United Space Alliance (USA) contractors at JSC, and Willbrook and Jacobs 
Engineering contractors at Marshall Space Flight Center. The Ares I-X SE&I trajectory team 
worked in conjunction with the other RSTWG members and the 45SW to develop the FFDP data 
product requirements using the AFSPCMAN 91-710 Volume 2, that was tailored to the Ares I-X 
test flight. Regular RSTWG meetings were held with the 45SW in attendance to provide a forum 
for identifying all requirements applicable to the flight test vehicle (FTV) and for developing 
appropriate methods to generate and verify those data products. The 45SW’s participation in the 
meetings provided guidance in properly understanding and interpreting the requirements and 
provided assurance that the method used to generate the products was acceptable. The JSC 
RSTWG team members have experience developing Space Shuttle Range Safety products. Their 
experience was combined with SE&I trajectory team’s knowledge of the FTV to develop the best 
  
 
method for producing Ares I-X specific data products that incorporate lessons learned throughout 
the Shuttle program.  
 VERIFICATION 
Verification of the FFDP data product’s accuracy and correctness was achieved through 
agreement between redundant FFDP data products generated by analysis teams at multiple 
NASA Centers using different simulation software. Each trajectory data product was developed 
by two separate analysis teams using simulation software specific to each team. Each analysis 
team implemented Ares I-X FTV specific models into their simulation software and performed 
their analyses as agreed upon in the RSTWG forum. The verification process consisted of two 
phases, simulation verification and results verification. Simulation verification was the process of 
verifying that each team’s vehicle, mission, and environmental inputs are obtained from the same 
source and that they are implemented correctly in each simulation. This was referred to as quality 
assurance (QA) verification in the RSTWG forum. Results verification was the process of verifying 
that all simulation runs required to generate the FFDP data products have been completed and 
that the data products are error free. Both QA and results verification were achieved through 
comparison of simulation output between the analysis teams. The verification approach assumed 
that if a model implementation error occurs or if an error occurs in the results generation, it does 
not manifest itself in both simulations in the same manner and will be identifiable through 
comparison of simulation results.  
SIMULATION COMPARISON OVERVIEW  
Each team worked with an Ares I-X tailored version of a 6DOF simulation. These will be 
referred to by the common name of the respective simulation throughout this paper: LaRC used 
Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2), JSC used Advanced NASA Technology 
Architecture for Exploration Studies (ANTARES), MSFC used Marshall Aerospace Vehicle 
Representation In C (MAVERIC).Two simulations involved in the RS process, but not directly 
involved in this Range Safety specific comparison were LaSRS and PROCONSUL. LaSRS was 
the simulation used in development of the Ares I-X Guidance and Control flight software. 
PROCONSUL was the simulation used by the Aerospace Corporation to verify the disposal 
footprints. 
Extensive simulation verification was performed prior to the start of the product 
generation. This activity served to ensure that each vehicle and environmental model was 
implemented properly, and that the methodology and implementation of the system dispersions, 
environmental dispersions, and failure modes were consistent. The verification process did not 
address the accuracy of input models. It was assumed that the developers of the individual 
models were responsible for the validation and accuracy of their model. 
As updates were provided by the project, referenced data was incorporated into the 
simulation. Table data, such as aerodynamic and mass properties, were transferred into their 
corresponding formats and coordinate frames. Verification of the implementation was conducted 
by running a test matrix, defined by the RSTWG, and comparing new models with prior released 
models. Any discrepancies were noted and further investigated to determine if there were issues 
with a specific simulation or if it occurred across all simulations. As each model was updated, its 
original source and date were noted and tracked in a common configuration management (CM) 
spreadsheet. This CM spreadsheet served the purpose of a math model database. It not only 
tracked the latest models, but also the implementation in the simulations. This was useful when it 
became necessary to make sure the latest updates were in a specific simulation; the spreadsheet 
was consulted and one could trace the project approved data to the file in which it was 
implemented. 
Both quantitative and qualitative comparisons were performed. Quantitative (required) 
metric violations were investigated to identify and correct the root cause. Qualitative (desired) 
metrics exceeded were evaluated within the allowable timeframe in an effort to resolve the 
  
 
difference. Raw comparison data took two forms: a 152 parameter set defined by the Ares I-X 
Guidance and Control (G&C) simulation community and an RS specific set covering the delivery 
data as well as malfunction related parameters. 
Significant effort went into automating the execution and comparison of the trajectories. 
This effort was well placed. Every time a new model was delivered, a malfunction implementation 
was modified or the launch date slipped, the compared trajectories were regenerated, verified, 
and compared. This was determined to be the only way to maintain adequate confidence that 
mistakes weren’t being introduced during the occasionally rapid update cycle. 
NOMINAL TRAJECTORY COMPARISON METHODOLOGY 
The nominal ascent trajectory is the baseline for all RS data products delivered to the 
Range. If there was any error in the trajectory simulation, it would manifest itself throughout the 
RS products. Several vehicle specific models were required to complete the nominal simulation: 
• Guidance and control flight software 
• Aerodynamics 
• Mass properties 
• Propulsion characteristics: ATK Solid Rocket Booster, reaction control thrusters 
While the IV&V activity did not verify that each of these models accurately reflected the 
vehicle configuration, the independent nature of implementing these models provided an 
indication that the models were implemented correctly. This assumes that because the same 
model is being implemented in two different simulations, the implementations would vary and 
therefore a common error occurring is unlikely. 
Tests of individual models (unit tests) were not compared between organizations; only 
integrated simulation results were compared. There is risk associated with this approach of 
making it more difficult to determine the source of a particular discrepancy. For example, an error 
in the gimbal location of the main engine will result in a mismatch between commanded 
deflections and moments induced on the vehicle. The control system will respond to the 
corresponding rates with gimbal corrections. The analyst troubleshooting this problem may have 
difficulty determining if the control system implementation is causing or responding to the issue. 
TOLERANCE DEVELOPMENT 
Exact matches between simulations were not required in order to verify accuracy. It was 
understood that different methodologies produce different results, but both can be representative 
of the truth. Quantifying the magnitude of an acceptable deviation between simulations, especially 
for the first flight of a new vehicle, can be challenging.  
Some tolerances were derived from simulation comparison tolerances used by the Space 
Shuttle Day-of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) process, however these tolerances have been 
honed over years of operations where differences can be eliminated by repeated analyses. In 
addition, some of the tolerances are particular to the nature of the trajectory designed for the 
Space Shuttle. 
Additional tolerances were derived from an interpretation of how the range safety 
products are processed. The impact point of the vehicle is a key parameter of the trajectory data 
used by the 45SW. Thus tolerances were derived based on the effects of differences in certain 
state parameters on the corresponding differences in downrange and cross range impact 
position. In effect, the partial derivatives of position and velocity components with respect to cross 
range and down range were computed by perturbing individual state parameters. These partials 
were formally computed at LaRC and confirmed with a similar analysis conducted by the JSC 
IV&V team. 
  
 
NOMINAL TRAJECTORY COMPARISON RESULTS 
Figure 1 contains a summary of the comparisons between POST2 and the verification 
simulations for the no wind and mean July winds case. The zero wind trajectory was used to 
isolate wind related effects and eliminate wind as a cause of control software related issues. All 
results were within the tolerances except for the pitch and/or yaw attitudes at separation. These 
differences were deemed acceptable since they were minor violations and they fell under the 
qualitative category. The critical parameters contained in the quantitative comparisons were all 
within the tolerances.  
Four other simulations varying only the wind were also performed using worst case 
directional winds. Worst case winds were not measured winds but instead were worst case winds 
from a RS perspective in that they assumed the maximum reasonable wind at all altitudes in the 
four cardinal directions: north, east, south, and west. A worst case wind in a single direction 
maximizes the effect of wind on the impact footprint. These wind cases were also compared and 
compare in a similar fashion to the no wind and mean wind cases. Only the pitch and/or yaw 
attitudes at separation were outside the tolerance; all other comparisons were within the 
tolerances.  
 
Figure 1 Notional Quantitative Simulation Comparison Data 
 
The match criteria were also compared as time history plots. Time history plots were 
qualitative criteria. Each parameter of the comparison data was co-plotted in this manner to 
confirm that the trajectories were similar from solid rocket booster (SRB) ignition through 
commanded staging. Figure 2 is an example groundtrack plot for a mean July wind. Note that the 
latitude scale (and thus trajectory difference) is exaggerated due to the nature of the trajectory 
(due East). Additional time history plots can be found in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2 Ground Track for a Mean July Wind and Difference Plot 
While the nominal ascent trajectory 
is the basis for all other trajectories, it is 
only a single, relatively benign 
representation of the flight conditions the 
vehicle may experience. Combined with the 
worst case winds they help characterize 
that each of the simulations were modeling 
the environment similarly and as well as the 
vehicle’s response to that environment. 
This capability to compare simulations 
under various conditions was important as 
models were redelivered and other 
conditions changed. 
Ares I-X was originally targeted for 
April 2009. This slipped to July, then to 
October as conditions required. When this 
happened, models had to be updated and 
products regenerated for new launch dates. 
The updated data was compared to the 
previous sets of data to confirm that only 
parameters expected to change with season 
(RSRM performance, atmosphere and wind) 
had changed and affected the trajectories. 
Figure 3 is an example of how a change in 
launch month affected the dynamic pressure 
history.  
Late in the mission design, it was 
determined there was a possibility of 
contacting the launch tower due to worst case 
vehicle drift. A “fly away” maneuver was added 
to the guidance and control and redelivered. 
This updated G&C was implemented in each of 
the Ares I-X simulations. Results from each 
simulation were compared to the prime GN&C 
simulation LaSRS. Results were also 
compared with previous results to confirm only 
the early part of the trajectory were different as 
well as to make sure each of the simulations 
Figure 4 Time history comparison of each of the 
range safety simulations and LaSRS. Note the 
simulations 1 and 4 had a set of control system inputs 
enabled causing the oscillations around 40, 60, and 80 
seconds. However the overall trends were within 
tolerances. 
Figure 3 Dynamic pressure comparing October 
POST, October ANTARES, and July ANTARES. 
The October data (1 and 2) have similar trends as the 
July data (3), however, both have a depressed 
maximum as a result of mean atmospheric 
properties. 
  
 
still matched each other. Figure 4 shows an example co-plot of these four simulations after 
implementation of the fly-away maneuver. These qualitative results were confirmed by the 
quantitative results which indicated the simulations were still within tolerances after the model 
updates. 
MALFUNCTION TRAJECTORY COMPARISON METHODOLOGY 
To confirm that the simulated FTV responded appropriately for a particular hardware or 
software failure, a diverse set of runs was developed to simulate vehicle failure conditions across 
a variety of flight regimes. This section briefly describes these runs and how these runs were 
selected. 
Malfunctions which lead to off-nominal trajectories, and often vehicle breakup due to 
aerodynamic or structural loads, are a key AFSPCMAN 91-710 requirement. Due to the number 
of different failures and the time window in which these failures can occur, thousands of different 
trajectories needed to be simulated. Attempting to verify each of these which would be time 
prohibitive, thus several representative cases were chosen. Each failure mode was modeled with 
failure times distributed across the two minutes of powered flight to capture failures at low speed, 
high dynamic pressure, and supersonic/low dynamic pressure flight regimes. 
Quantitative and qualitative comparisons were also performed on these trajectories. 
Because of the rapidly changing dynamics involved in the malfunction scenarios, it was expected 
that the tolerances used for the nominal comparison would not be large enough. Additional 
evaluation criteria were added including time of breakup. Time of breakup, or more precisely the 
range of breakup times, is a key component of the data delivery. This range of times is defined by 
an early (conservative) breakup time and a late (zero margin) breakup time. 
MALFUNCTION TRAJECTORY COMPARISON RESULTS 
Figure 5 Notional Quantitative Off-Nominal Comparison Data 
  
 
A summary of the comparisons between the first three POST2 and ANTARES 
malfunction cases are shown in Figure 5. One important consideration for the malfunction runs is 
the possibility of the end of the trajectories occurring at different times and thus at greatly different 
conditions. It was determined that breakup times were to be one tolerance, and all other 
tolerances were to be evaluated at the last time both simulations had in common. This was 
typically the last even second prior to the 
breakup of the simulation that predicted 
breakup earliest. 
Malfunction trajectories can be 
very dynamic. This forced the IV&V team, 
with the concurrence of the RSTWG, to 
treat attitude and body rate criteria as 
qualitative. This concurrence occurred 
only after it could be demonstrated that 
both simulations were modeling the 
vehicle dynamics similarly, yet small 
differences in initial conditions (those at 
the start of the malfunction) often led to 
large differences at a given time after this.  
Figure 6 shows the sideslip angle 
comparison between ANTARES (1) and 
POST2 (2) for October conditions. This 
shows not only that the two simulations 
match very closely for the duration of the 
trajectory, the also differ from the July 
ANTARES data (3). Figure 6 is also an 
example of a malfunction trajectory in 
which breakup (the end of the data) 
occurred within the 1 second tolerance.  
Figure 7 provides an example in 
which the breakup attitude is not within 
tolerances. After investigation it was 
decided to be acceptable (minor 
changes in the conditions during a 
dramatic tumbling trajectory caused 
significant differences in this scenario. 
These plots, although used qualitatively 
only, provided an indicator that both 
simulations were responding to the 
malfunction in a similar manner. 
 
TRAJECTORY ENVELOPES 
The ascent envelope trajectories delivered to the 45SW provide information on whether 
or not a vehicle is performing within the limits of normality, based on known vehicle system and 
environmental dispersions. The 45SW requires six envelopes be developed, maximum 
instantaneous vacuum impact point (MaxIIP), minimum instantaneous vacuum impact point 
(MinIIP), right instantaneous vacuum impact point (RIIP), left instantaneous vacuum impact point 
(LIIP), launch area steep (LAS), and Launch area Lateral (LAL). A vehicle flying within the 
envelope trajectories is considered normal, while a vehicle flying outside an envelope alerts the 
range to a possible vehicle system malfunction. It is important to provide accurate envelope 
information, so as to avoid flight termination of a vehicle that is otherwise performing within known 
Figure 7 Sideslip angle for malfunction case 10 
Figure 6 Sideslip angle for malfunction case 18 
  
 
uncertainties. The following subsections discuss the methodology used to IV&V the trajectory 
envelopes and the results of that IV&V. 
TRAJECTORY ENVELOPE IV&V METHODOLOGY 
The Ares I-X ascent flight envelope methodology was jointly developed by the 
stakeholders within the RSTWG. The 45SW provided oversight to ensure that the methodology 
used satisfied their requirements for flight plan approval. The JSC team, with experience 
generating Space Shuttle Range Safety products for the 45SW, provided inputs on the 
methodology as well as lessons learned from the SSP. This included comparisons of the 
individual Ares I-X dispersion parameters against those used in the SSP. The MSFC team 
performed the trajectory analyses used to verify the six envelopes. This analysis is discussed in 
detail in the paper “Ares I-X Range Safety Three Sigma Trajectory Envelope Analysis
1
”. As part 
of the ascent envelope data delivery process, the ascent flight envelope trajectories were 
required to be in a range specific format. The JSC team formatted the trajectories created by 
LaRC using existing Space Shuttle tools. For verification, the LaRC team created separate tools 
to generate the formatted trajectories and ensured that the output matched. 
To accommodate changes in the launch date, envelopes were developed for a launch 
season from July through November. Analyses were conducted to determine which month in the 
launch season resulted in the most extreme envelope, i.e. furthest up range, down range, 
steepest, shallowest, northern most, and southern most.  
The Ares I-X ascent flight envelope data verification was accomplished through both 
qualitative and quantitative assessments of the results, reviewed and approved by the RSTWG. 
The LaRC team used the POST2 simulation to generate the dispersed trajectories, while MSFC 
used the MAVERIC simulation for verification. Both centers conducted sensitivity analyses 
comparing the effects of each dispersion parameter on the nominal trajectory to ensure that they 
were being modeled correctly, and that the dispersions providing the largest deviations from 
nominal were similar between simulations. Each center’s trajectories were plotted in their 
respective envelope planes and compared qualitatively to ensure that the distribution of 
trajectories about the nominal were similar. Statistical bounds were produced from the 
distributions for each simulation and were compared. The differences between the two 
simulations were quantitatively compared using the simulation match criteria previously 
established for the simulation comparison. The differences between the two simulations fell within 
the established criteria, thus meeting the verification requirements. 
TRAJECTORY ENVELOPE IV&V RESULTS 
The qualitative comparison of the envelope trajectories was performed by plotting the 
Monte Carlo sweeps side by side and visually comparing the trends. If there are significant errors 
in the simulations or method of post-processing, the dispersed trajectories will diverge 
dramatically. The qualitative comparisons were adequate to continue on to the quantitative 
comparisons. Figure 8 shows the qualitative comparison of the Monte Carlo sets for the 
Maximum IIP envelope. Plots for the other envelopes are included in Appendix B. 
  
 
POST2 MAVERIC
 
Figure 8 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the Maximum IIP 
 The quantitative comparison was performed by extracting the calculated boundary from 
each of the Monte Carlo sets and differencing the plots. Figure 9 shows the POST2 and 
MAVERIC derived RIIP and LIIP envelope trajectories co-plotted followed by a difference plot 
showing that all trajectories fell within the simulation comparison criteria. 
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Figure 9 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma RIIP and LIIP envelope trajectories and differences 
After the successful test flight, the best estimated trajectory (BET), which represents the 
actual trajectory on launch day, compared well with the preflight nominal trajectory and within the 
flight envelopes providing confidence that the assumptions made and methodology used to 
create the envelopes were reasonable.  
MALFUNCTION TURN 
JSC provided the IV&V for LaRC’s malfunction turn analysis. In addition to LaRC’s 
knowledge of the flight test vehicle, the JSC team contributed knowledge from delivering Space 
Shuttle RS products, experience conducting malfunction turn analyses, and an established 
relationship with the 45SW. The MT analysis determines the launch vehicle’s maximum turning 
capability, or deviations from the nominal trajectory, caused by a single failure. The following data 
products are created from this analysis: 
 a set of malfunction turn trajectories, 
  
 
 a composite table describing the maximum turn angle of the velocity vectors produced 
from the set of malfunction turn trajectories at time intervals following the malfunction, 
and  
 a list of all trajectories with the corresponding time of vehicle breakup and the probability 
of occurrence. 
These products were delivered with the Final Flight Data Package (FFDP) and provide 
the 45SW an understanding of how the vehicle may behave due to a failure and information to 
build destruct criteria and calculate risk. The following discusses the Ares I-X IV&V process used 
for the Malfunction Turn analysis. 
MALFUNCTION TURN IV&V METHODOLOGY 
The JSC IV&V team worked with LaRC and the RSTWG in the development of analysis 
and product generation methodology to validate that the analysis satisfied the requirements. With 
RSTWG approval, the teams identified vehicle failure scenarios, developed the malfunction turn 
trajectory run matrix, and defined the product composition. The IV&V team ran the malfunction 
turn trajectories using ANTARES and created an independent composite turn table and table of 
vehicle breakup times to compare to the data produced by LaRC’s POST2 and verify the MT data 
product.  
Validation of the failure modes, run matrix, and product composition was achieved 
primarily through RSTWG discussions, incorporating the LaRC team’s knowledge of the flight test 
vehicle, the shuttle experience of the IV&V team, and the 45SW customer. The vehicle failure 
modes were based on legacy Space Shuttle failure modes and the Ares I-X Range Safety 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment report. Several analyses were conducted to validate the run matrix 
including a study to determine if the thrust vector control (TVC) failures were simulated at a fine 
enough sweep of actuator deflection angles. Analysis was also conducted to validate the method 
for producing the composite turn angle. Results of these analyses are discussed in the following 
subsection.  
Once the failure modes were approved through the RSTWG and implemented in POST2 
and ANTARES, malfunction turn trajectories were verified by comparing simulation output of a 
representative set of trajectories for similar vehicle response. This process was termed 
“simulation quality assurance” (sim QA) and is discussed in the section on malfunction trajectory 
comparison methodology. Additional discussion of the selection and implementation of vehicle 
failure modes may be found in the “Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range Safety Analysis” paper.
2
 
Since it was not feasible to compare the more than 8000 trajectories directly, it was accepted that 
the trajectories identified in the sim QA would be compared along with a few randomly selected 
runs, and a check was made to confirm the same run matrix was generated by both centers. 
With confidence that the failure modes were implemented correctly and the simulations 
produced similar trajectories meeting tolerances, the composite turn angle table product was 
verified by comparing the tables produced with results from each simulation. The composite turn 
angle table provides the maximum turn angle of the velocity vector, or deviation from the nominal 
trajectory, produced from all the failures simulated at each failure time in one second intervals 
from the time of failure to twelve seconds after the time of failure. An example of this table is 
shown below in Table 2 and further discussion may be found in “Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range 
Safety Analysis” paper. 
2
 The tables were directly compared by plotting the maximum turn angle 
produced by all failures at each time of failure. Points that did not compare favorably were further 
investigated and the results are discussed in the following section. 
 
  
 
The IV&V team verified 
the vehicle structural breakup 
times for each trajectory in the 
trajectory probability table. The 
break up times are not only a 
deliverable to the 45SW but they 
also impact the development of 
the composite turn angle table 
because the velocity turn angle of 
an individual trajectory is not 
considered once the structural 
break up has occurred. A vehicle 
structural break up model was 
implemented in each sim to 
determine if and when the 
malfunction turn trajectory 
resulted in vehicle structural 
failure. Two break up times are 
listed for each trajectory, a late 
break up time based on passing the design structural loads, and an early time based off a factor 
of safety of two on the design structural loads. The POST2 and ANTARES results were directly 
compared and the differences investigated as discussed in the Malfunction Turn Trajectory 
Comparison section and the following results section.  
Additionally the JSC team was responsible for working with the Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) team to incorporate the probability of each trajectory into the trajectory 
probability table which summarizes all trajectories run and their breakup times. JSC also 
formatted all of the data in a range-specific format and delivered the product to the range. On 
completion of the integration and formatting of the malfunction turn data product the LaRC and 
the PRA teams verified that the data had not been modified and was ready for delivery. 
MALFUNCTION TURN IV&V RESULTS 
As mentioned above the failure modes and run matrix were developed collaboratively by 
the prime and IV&V teams and vetted through the RSTWG. Several analyses were performed to 
support the inclusion or exclusion of proposed failure modes and define how the failure modes 
should be modeled
2
. For example the 45SW expressed concern that the selection of actuator 
deflections used to represent TVC failures (actuator lock in place, drift to null, and hard over 
failures) would not adequately capture the worst case trajectory. To investigate this concern and 
verify the TVC failures met the requirements, the IV&V team conducted an analysis to find the 
TVC failure at each failure time that produced the greatest throw distance relative to the nominal 
IIP at four seconds after the failure time (as specified by the 45SW). The throw distance is 
defined as the great-circle distance between the nominal IIP and malfunction turn IIP at a point in 
time. The analysis identified that of the TVC failures, the dual actuator failures resulted in the 
greatest throw distance from the nominal IIP. The TVC deflection combinations that resulted in 
the greatest IIP throw distance for each failure time was captured and the 61 cases were added 
to the MT run matrix. Additional discussion of this analysis is found in Appendix D. 
The TVC actuator failure analysis revealed that the method that had been used for 
generating the composite turn angle table was based on the trajectory that produced the largest 
turn angle while the 45SW intended for the table to be comprised of the turn angle of the 
trajectory that provided the greatest throw distance, or deviation of the MT from the nominal IIP. 
The JSC IV&V team then further investigated the method for generating the composite turn table 
by directly comparing tables generated using each method. Because the 45SW is primarily 
interested in only the turn angles four seconds after the malfunction failure time, it was concluded 
that the maximum throw distance method could be reasonably represented by the maximum turn 
angle data. The analysis, described in Appendix E, validated the process used for generating the 
Table 2 Composite Turn Angle Table Example 
  
 Time in Turn (seconds) 
 
Time of Failure 
(seconds) 
1 2 
Angle 
(deg) 
Velocity 
(fps) 
Angle 
(deg) 
Velocity 
(fps) 
18 1.44 510.96 1.87 580.47 
20 1.24 576.24 1.84 646.55 
22 1.25 642.25 1.85 711.14 
24 1.2 705.99 1.83 773.48 
26 1.2 767.89 1.81 834.48 
28 1.19 828.76 1.79 883.24 
30 1.17 888.88 1.78 942.61 
32 1.15 948.24 1.77 1001.12 
 
  
 
composite turn angle table was reasonable for this vehicle, but future vehicle malfunction turn 
analyses would be required to build the table with angles from the trajectories with the greatest 
throw distance. 
The POST2 composite turn angle table was verified by direct comparison at each second 
in the turn for all failure times with the table generated from ANTARES data. Figure 10 provides 
an example of turn angle data that compared favorably (left) and data that did not match well 
throughout (right). 
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Figure 10 POST2/ANTARES turn angle comparison at 2 and 4 seconds after failure initiation 
The investigation of the difference in the turn angles concluded that a different trajectory 
produced the maximum turn angle at the particular failure time. This was due to slight differences 
in the vehicle break up model timing. For example, at right in Figure 10 above, the break up 
model in ANTARES indicated break up earlier than the model in POST2. Therefore the POST2 
trajectory flew longer and produced a greater turn angle. The identical ANTARES trajectory was 
then compared to the contributing POST2 trajectory and in all cases it compared favorably. Since 
the POST2 composite turn angle table provided larger, more conservative turn angles, and the 
trajectory matched the ANTARES trajectory up to the ANTARES breakup, it was considered 
acceptable for delivery. 
The vehicle structural breakup model was changed late in the malfunction turn analysis 
leaving insufficient time to implement the new model in the IV&V simulation. The ANTARES and 
POST2 trajectories were rerun to also incorporate various model updates and then compared 
similarly to the process described in the Simulation Comparison Overview section. To verify the 
final POST2 breakup times, a separate structural analysis tool was used to process the trajectory 
data. The break up times generated through the model internal to POST2 and the external tool 
were then compared. Since the ANTARES and POST2 trajectories compared favorably up to the 
breakup times and the two structural breakup models compared favorably, the POST2 
malfunction turn analysis data was decided to be adequately verified. 
After each piece of the malfunction turn product was verified, the delivery product was 
gathered so it could be compiled on compact disk (CD). An extensive QA check list was 
developed to ensure that no errors or inconsistencies were present during the formatting and 
delivery process. The formatted trajectories were verified by three levels of QA to have the 
correct data frequency and formatting required by the 45SW; defined in AFSCM 80-12. A script 
was used to check all MT trajectories for common formatting errors, including tabs, commas, line 
feeds and carriage returns.  
In addition to these checks, each QA level took three random MT trajectories per failure 
type and compared the time of failure state of the MT trajectory against the corresponding time in 
the nominal trajectory. Each QA also checked the time of failure for the MT turn trajectory against 
the trajectory probability table. This check was to ensure that the time of failure is listed up to, and 
encompassed by, the final time point recorded in the trajectory and also confirmed that the 
trajectories produced were indeed the intended run matrix. The trajectory probability table was 
  
 
also checked numerically. Each QA level added the probabilities for each failure type and 
checked against the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) document for consistency.  
A numerical difference was also done between the final delivery CD and that contained 
on the drive. This check verified that all trajectories had a relative tolerance of 1.0E-5 and an 
absolute tolerance of 1.0E-8 to both the formatted and original non-formatted trajectories 
provided by LaRC. 
DISPOSAL 
The disposal footprints delivered to the 45SW provide information on where the spent 
First Stage (FS) and Upper Stage Simulator (USS) were predicted to land in the water at the end 
of the test flight. These footprints were delivered as 3-sigma impact ellipses that represented the 
range of expected landing locations (latitude/longitude coordinates) of each stage at the time of 
water impact. These impact ellipses were used by the 45SW to establish keepout zones for ship 
and aircraft traffic and to determine ship placement for first stage tracking and recovery vessels. 
To compute these ellipses a multi-body reentry trajectory simulation was developed that modeled 
the descent of both stages from the time of separation until water impact. Both stages’ descents 
were uncontrolled. The 3-sigma ellipses were determined from 2,000 Monte Carlo runs that 
modeled off-nominal dispersions in winds, atmosphere, mass properties, vehicle propulsion and 
aerodynamics. Dispersions on initial state (position, velocity, attitude and attitude rate) were also 
considered and were obtained from the Ares I-X trajectory envelope Monte Carlo analysis 
discussed in the previous sections. The following subsections describe the method in which these 
disposal footprints were verified and present some of the key verification results 
DISPOSAL IV&V METHODOLOGY 
The disposal footprints delivered to the 45SW were computed by LaRC using POST2. A 
separate multi-body reentry simulation was developed for verification by the Aerospace 
Corporation using PROCONSUL, an Aerospace-developed simulation tool which wraps static 
vehicle data (i.e. mass properties information, propulsion tables, aerodynamic coefficient tables, 
etc) and event sequencing around FORTRAN 95 dynamics code. Integration of dynamic states is 
performed within PROCONSUL using a fourth-order Runge-Kutta methodology with variable step 
size.
4 
A two-step verification process was employed to ensure that simulation models were 
implemented properly and that the corresponding simulation results were accurate. The first step 
was a QA check that focused on verifying each individual simulation model. To perform this check 
each simulation model was implemented independently in both POST2 and PROCONSUL and a 
nominal trajectory was run without any dispersions. After obtaining an acceptable match for the 
nominal case, twenty-one additional dispersed cases were then run in each simulation to test the 
implementation of each of the different simulation models. The second step in the verification 
process was an integrated simulation check that verified the integration of all of the simulation 
models and the Monte Carlo process itself. For this check a 2000-case Monte Carlo analysis was 
run in both simulations using different random dispersion sets and the results were compared to 
ensure that trends were similar and that the disposal footprints were comparable.  
Much of the time devoted to this entire process was spent on the first step (QA check). 
The twenty-one QA cases that were simulated to test the various first stage models are listed in 
Table 3. These cases were chosen to individually test each of the major simulation models that 
were implemented in the reentry simulation; each dispersion was run separately to isolate the 
effect of that dispersion and ensure that it had been modeled correctly. A smaller, but similar, set 
was run to test the various Upper Stage models.  
In Table 3 the initial state dispersion refers to the position and velocity of the vehicle at 
the time of stage separation. These states were taken from a 2000-case Monte Carlo set 
generated with a separate simulation (Ares I-X POST2 Ascent Simulation, discussed previously) 
  
 
and were used as initial conditions for the reentry simulations. For the QA check, the cases with 
the highest and lowest staging altitudes were arbitrarily chosen. Next, atmosphere and wind 
dispersions were computed using Version 1.4 of the 2007 Global Reference Atmosphere Model 
(GRAM 2007)
5 
and the same dispersed atmosphere was run in each simulation. Additional QA 
cases were chosen that exercised dispersions in mass properties (total mass, center-of-gravity 
location, moment of inertia values) and propulsion models (propellant mean bulk temperature, 
propellant burn rate and ignition delays). The final eight cases were required to fully verify the 
implementation of the various aerodynamic models. Specifically, freestream axial and normal 
coefficients were run at their three-sigma limits, the center-of-pressure was moved to its most 
forward and most aft ranges, aerodynamic damping derivatives (Cmq and Cnr) were run at their 
three-sigma limits, and increments that modeled the effect of aerodynamic interference from the 
USS (CA, CN and CM) were run at their three-sigma limits. 
Table 3 Quality Assurance Cases Used to Verify Ares I-X Reentry Simulation 
Case Description Dispersion Dispersion Type 
1 
High Altitude 
Stage Separation State 
From Highest Altitude 
Ascent Trajectory 
Initial State 
2 
Low Altitude  
Stage Separation State 
From Lowest Altitude 
Ascent Trajectory 
3 Dispersed Atmosphere From GRAM 2007 Atmosphere/Winds 
4 Axial Center-of-Gravity +10" + 10 inches 
Mass Properties 
5 Axial Center of Gravity -10" – 10 inches 
6 High Mass + 2,000 lbm 
7 Low Mass – 2,000 lbm 
8 High Yaw Moment of Inertia +10% 
9 Low Yaw Moment of Inertia –10% 
10 High Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature +30 deg 
BDM/BTM Dispersions 
11 Low Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature – 30 deg 
12 
High Performing Booster Deceleration 
Motor & Booster Tumble Motor 
+3-s Burn Rate  
and Ignition Delay 
13 
Low Performing Booster Deceleration 
Motor & Booster Tumble Motor 
–3-s Burn Rate  
and Ignition Delay 
14 
High Freestream Axial & Normal Aero 
Coefficients 
+1-s 
Aerodynamic 
Uncertainties 
15 
Low Freestream Axial & Normal Aero 
Coefficients 
–1-s 
16 Forward Center-of-Pressure +1-s 
17 Rearward Center-of-Pressure –1-s 
18 High Aerodynamic Damping Coefficients + 30% 
19 Low Aerodynamic Damping Coefficients –30 % 
20 High Wake Aerodynamic Increments +30 % 
21 Low Wake Aerodynamic Increments –30 % 
 
Once all of the QA cases were run, the results from each simulation were compared. 
Using engineering judgment, a set of metrics was developed to assess the quality of the 
comparison and to determine if the difference between the disposal footprints determined by each 
simulation were within the accuracy requirements of the 45SW. The various metrics used to 
compare simulation results are listed in Table 4. Each metric was computed by differencing 
results between the two simulations. Two metrics that were considered requirements were 
developed from the AFSPCMAN 91-710 requirements for radar tracking accuracy that mandated 
a tracking accuracy of 5% in down range position and 0.5% in cross range position. Since that 
level of accuracy was acceptable to the 45SW, it was adopted as a QA/IV&V requirement which 
had to be met before the disposal footprint results could be delivered to the 45SW. As a result, 
the difference in down range and cross range between the POST2 and PROCONSUL simulations 
for all of the QA cases had to be less than 5% and 0.5% respectively of the total range of the 
nominal trajectory (~113 nm). The other metrics listed in the table were treated as guidelines that, 
  
 
when met, increased confidence in the correctness of the simulations. While there was no strict 
requirement on meeting these guidelines, in practice, simulation development continued within an 
allowable timeframe to meet schedule until each QA case satisfied all of the metrics. There was a 
single QA case that did not meet one of the guideline metrics, but because the reason for the 
violation was understood and did not impact the disposal footprint accuracy, it was considered 
acceptable. 
Table 4 Quality Assurance Verification Metrics and Nominal Case Results 
Metric 
Do Not 
Exceed Value 
Nominal 
Case 
*First Stage Down Range at Drogue Deploy within 5% of total 
down range (nm) 
5.00 –0.13 
*First Stage Cross Range at Drogue Deploy within 5% of total 
down range (nm) 
2.50 –0.01 
Total Angle-of-Attack Profiles within 15 deg 15.00 0.39 
Trim attitude at drogue deploy within 5 deg 5.00 –0.02 
RSS of pitch and yaw rate profile within 10 deg/s 10.00 0.24 
Altitude profiles within 2% 2.00 0.09 
Flight path angle profiles within 1 deg 1.00 0.02 
Heading angle profile within 1 deg 1.00 0.11 
Dynamic pressure profiles within 10% of maximum value 10.00 –0.09 
Mach at max. dynamic pressure within 0.1 0.10 0.00 
Angle of Attack after stage separation (t = 3 sec) within 0.25 deg 0.25 0.00 
Sideslip angle after stage separation (t = 3 sec) within 0.25 deg 0.25 0.00 
Pitch rate after tumble motor burn (t = 6 sec) within 0.25 deg/s 0.25 0.00 
Yaw rate after tumble motor burn (t = 6 sec) within 0.25 deg/s 0.25 0.00 
Roll rate after tumble motor burn (t = 6 sec) within 0.25 deg/s 0.25 0.00 
Time to reach end of aerodynamic interference zone within 1 sec 1.00 0.01 
 
Once the QA process was completed, a full Monte Carlo analysis was performed in both 
simulations. Checks were made for consistency between POST2 and PROCONSUL for a number 
of key statistical results, the most important of which were the disposal footprints.  
DISPOSAL IV&V RESULTS 
Staging of the Ares I-X FTV nominally occurs near Mach 4.6 at an altitude of 
approximately 130,000. At staging, eight booster deceleration motors (BDMs) on FS are ignited 
and act to reduce the velocity of the FS relative to the USS. After separation the aerodynamically 
unstable USS begins to tumble as it descends to water impact. Three seconds after staging four 
booster tumble motors (BTMs) mounted on the FS are ignited to induce a tumbling motion 
predominantly about the negative yaw-axis. For the first 15-20 sec after staging, the FS is in the 
wake of the USS and thus is subjected to aerodynamic interference effects. The FS reaches an 
apogee altitude of ~150,000 ft roughly 40 sec after staging and maximum dynamic pressure 
(max. q) ~120 sec after staging. For a nominal separation trajectory, the FS reaches max-q 
conditions at a total angle-of-attack (T) between 40 and 140 deg (referred to as a “broad-side” 
entry). This attitude is desired at max-q because it results in the lowest peak dynamic pressure 
levels. For some off-nominal conditions it is possible for the FS to have a nose-first (0 deg < T < 
40 deg) or tail-first (140 deg < T < 180 deg) attitude at max-q. These trim attitudes are less 
desirable since they result in larger peak dynamic pressure levels (especially in the case of a 
nose-first reentry). The probability of each of these three trim attitudes occurring during reentry 
given the range of off-nominal dispersions was a key pre-flight Monte Carlo result that was 
compared in both POST2 and PROCONSUL as part of the verification process. 
  
 
Once the FS descends to an altitude of 16,500 ft, drogue parachutes are deployed. When 
the FS reaches an altitude of 4,500 ft, the drogues are released and the main parachutes further 
decelerate the FS to an impact velocity of ~71 ft/sec. The entire parachute sequence from drogue 
deployment to water impact takes roughly 60-65 sec. 
Due to time limitations, the parachute sequence was only modeled in the POST2 
simulation. Parachute modeling in POST2 was verified by comparison to a different simulation 
(not PROCONSUL) and that verification is not discussed here. However, since the FS descended 
nearly vertical from the time of drogue deploy, the footprint at 16,500 ft was well within 0.01 deg 
in longitude and latitude to the footprint at water impact. Thus, for the purposes of this range 
safety verification, the simulation comparison ended at an altitude of 16,500 ft. The disposal 
footprints that were ultimately delivered to the 45SW were computed by POST2 and did include 
the parachute deploy sequence. 
As mentioned previously, the required metrics for each of the QA cases were met and 
were well within the do-not-exceed tolerances listed in Table 4. Likewise, nearly all of the 
guideline metrics were met for each of the QA cases. The single QA case (Case 18, +30% 
damping coefficients) that slightly exceeded the heading angle guideline near the end of the 
trajectory was considered acceptable since the FS flight path was nearly vertical at that point. 
Figure 11 shows representative total angle-of-attack comparison plots between the two 
simulations for the off-nominal atmosphere case, case 3. The plot on the left is the actual time 
history and on the right is a difference plot that shows the total angle-of-attack result computed by 
PROCONSUL subtracted from the POST2 result at each time point. Similar comparison plots are 
shown in Figure 12 for the dynamic pressure profile for the same QA case. These comparison 
plots were typical for all of the metrics and QA cases that were examined for both the FS and the 
USS. 
  
 a. Time history. b. Difference plot. 
Figure 11 Off-nominal trajectory comparison, first stage total angle-of-attack profile 
  
 
  
 a. Time history. b. Difference plot. 
Figure 12 Off-nominal trajectory comparison, first stage dynamic pressure profile 
 
After successfully completing the QA verification, a final Monte Carlo analysis 
comparison was performed using the full set of simulation model dispersions that were tested 
individually in the QA verification. For this comparison, 2,000 Monte Carlo cases that randomly 
perturbed all of the dispersions simultaneously were run in both POST2 and PROCONSUL using 
the distribution for each dispersion. While the random distributions were the same, the actual 
dispersed parameter values used in each perturbed case differed in each simulation. Overall, the 
level of agreement in the statistical results generated by each simulation was excellent. A 
representative example of the statistical results from each simulation is shown in Table 5, which 
compares the 50 and 97.7 percentile values of key parameters at the time of maximum dynamic 
pressure. The statistics at maximum dynamic pressure were not required by the 45SW but were 
important to the test flight program and needed to be quantified prior to flight to estimate the 
critical loads occurred that occur then.  
Also shown in Table 5 is the percentage of the 2,000 cases that had a trim attitude at 
max-q that was nose-first, broad-side or tail-first, respectively. Due to peak loading concerns a 
broad-side max-q trim attitude was desirable, a tail-first was tolerable and a nose-first would 
result in drogue deployment failure. The results presented in Table 5 were conservative since 
they used worst-case center-of-gravity location assumptions. Again, there is very good 
agreement between the results generated by each code. 
Table 5 First stage Monte Carlo statistics comparison at maximum dynamic pressure 
 50 Percentile 97.7 Percentile 
At Max. Dynamic Pressure POST2 PROCONSUL POST2 PROCONSUL 
Dynamic Pressure, psf 495 505 3589 3596 
Total Angle-of-Attack, deg 111.4 113.0 155.7 155.9 
Mach number 2.61 2.60 3.38 3.37 
Altitude, kft 66.85 65.57 84.42 84.29 
        
Percent Nose-First 18.75 18.36   
Percent Broad-Side 62.15 62.98   
Percent Tail-First 19.10 18.66   
 
Another important comparison that was performed was for the disposal footprint. Figure 
13 shows the ellipse of latitude/longitude pairs at drogue deploy as determined using POST2 and 
  
 
PROCONSUL. The ellipses are very similar and the coordinates of the centroid differ by less than 
0.005 deg (approximately 0.3 nm) which is well within the established requirement. The individual 
impact locations are color coded by entry type. Typically, the broad-side cases populate the left 
(western) portion of the ellipse and the nose-first and tail-first cases populate the right (eastern) 
portion. This disposal footprint was delivered to the 45SW as required by the AFSPCMAN 91-710 
requirements document.  
Similarly to the envelopes the actual impact location for the first stage and the actual 
projected impact for the upper stage were compared to the BET and fell within the preflight 
predicted footprints. 
 
   
 a. POST2 b. PROCONSUL 
Figure 13 Comparison of first stage disposal footprint computed by POST2 and PROCONSUL 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Ares I-X RS FFDP IV&V proved to be a valuable asset to the RS product analysis 
and generation process. The IV&V effort allowed data generators to work through issues early 
such that a high quality, complete product was generated and delivered to the 45SW, thereby 
contributing to the successful launch of Ares I-X. The validation effort improved the content of and 
the method for generating the product. The verification effort proved that the data delivered was 
reasonable. Throughout this process errors and issues were uncovered early and resolved in 
both simulation modeling and product generation. The IV&V data proved consistent in content 
and scope to LaRC’s data, thereby providing confidence that the deliverable data was of high 
quality. The 45SW was able to use the RS FFDP product data to build their mission range safety 
support data and displays and ensure public safety.  
. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to recognize the numerous contributions of individuals from NASA, the 
45SW, and several government contractors who actively participated in the development of the 
FFDP for Ares I-X. The data package was successfully completed due to the knowledge and skill 
of many talented individuals from organizations across the country. Specifically the authors would 
like to thank Andre Brochier of the Aerospace Corp. for his assistance and hard work in 
completing the verification activities for the Ares I-X reentry simulation, and Stephanie Sumcad at 
NASA JSC for her analysis on the generation method of the malfunction turn composite turn 
angle table. 
  
 
REFERENCES 
1. Starr, Brett R., et.al., “Ares I-X Range Safety Three Sigma Trajectory Envelope Analysis, ” 
JANNAF Propulsion Meeting, Arlington, VA, April 18-22, 2011. 
 
2. Beaty, James R., “Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range Safety Analysis,” JANNAF Propulsion 
Meeting, Arlington, VA, April 18-22, 2011. 
 
3. Starr, Brett R. et.al., “Ares I-X Range Safety Overview,” JANNAF Propulsion Meeting, 
Arlington, VA, April 18-22, 2011. 
 
4.  A. Brochier, C. Heidelberger, "Ares I-X Reentry Analysis," Aerospace Corporation, ATR-
2009(5472)-17, August 26 2009. 
 
5. Justus, C.G., F.W. Leslie, “The NASA MSFC Earth Global Reference Atmospheric Model – 
2007 Version”, NASA TM 2008-215581, November 2008. 
GLOSSARY 
45SW  =  45th Space Wing 
6DOF  = 6 Degrees-of-Freedom 
AFSPCMAN =  Air Force Space Command Manual 
DOLILU = Day-of-Launch I-Load Update 
ANTARES = Advanced NASA Technology Architecture for Exploration Studies 
ATK  = Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
BDM  = Booster Deceleration Motors 
BTM  = Booster Tumble Motors 
FFDP  = Final Flight Data Package 
FFPA  = Final Flight Plan Approval 
FS  = First Stage 
FTV  = Flight Test Vehicle 
IV&V  = Independent Validation and Verification 
JSC  = Johnson Space Center 
LaRC  = Langley Research Center 
LCRSP  = Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
MAVERIC = Marshall Aerospace Vehicle Representation In C 
MFCO  = Mission Flight Control Officer 
MSFC  = Marshall Space Flight Center 
MT  = Malfunction Turn 
PFPA  = Preliminary Flight Plan Approval 
POST2  = Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II 
PROCONSUL = Programmer's Continuous Simulation Tool 
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APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL NOMINAL TRAJECTORY COMPARISON PLOTS 
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Figure 14 Total Angle of Attack for a Mean July Wind Time History and Difference 
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Figure 15 Relative Velocity for a Mean July Wind Time History and Difference 
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Figure 16 Altitude for a Mean July Wind Time History Plot and Difference Plot 
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Figure 17 Flight Path Angle for a Mean July Wind Time History and Difference 
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Figure 18 Heading Angle for a Mean July Wind Time History and Difference 
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Figure 19 Roll and Pitch Angle Relative to the Plumbline Mean July Wind Time History 
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Figure 20 Yaw Angle Relative to the Plumbline Mean July Wind Time History and the Difference for 
the Attitudes Relative to the Plumbline 
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Figure 21 IIP’s for a Mean July Wind and Difference Plot 
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Figure 22 Mach vs Dynamic Pressure for MAVERIC and POST2 
 
  
 
APPENDIX B ADDITIONAL DISPERSED TRAJECTORY COMPARISON PLOTS 
 
Figure 23 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the LAS trajectory 
 
Figure 24 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the LAL trajectory 
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Figure 25 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the Minimum IIP 
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Figure 26 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the Left IIP 
 
Figure 27 POST and MAVERIC dispersion plots for the Right IIP 
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APPENDIX C  ADDITIONAL ENVELOPE TRAJECTORY COMPARISON PLOTS 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000
Zv
rt
 (
ft
)
Yvrt (ft)
LAL
MAVERIC LAL
MAVERIC nominal
POST LAL
 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
Zv
rt
 (
ft
)
Xvrt (ft)
LAS
MAVERIC LAS
MAVERIC nominal
POST LAS
 
Figure 28 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Envelope Trajectories for the LAS and LAL 
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Figure 29 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Difference Plot for the LAS and LAL 
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Figure 30 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Envelope Trajectories for the LIIP and RIIP 
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Figure 31 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Difference Plot for the LIIP and RIIP 
  
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
T
im
e
 (
s
e
c
)
Downrange IIP (n.mi.)
Maximum & Minimum IIP's
Maveric MaxIIP 
Maveric MinIIP
POST MaxIIP
POST MinIIP
 
Figure 32 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Envelope Trajectories for the MaxIIP and MinIIP 
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Figure 33 POST and MAVERIC 4-Sigma Difference Plot for the MaxIIP and MinIIP 
  
 
APPENDIX D  THRUST VECTOR CONTROL (TVC) ACTUATOR DEFLECTION 
OPTIMIZATION FOR GREATEST THROW DISTANCE 
OVERVIEW 
45SW analysts were concerned that the sweep used for TVC failures was too coarse and 
may miss the trajectory that results in the greatest IP deviation from the nominal trajectory. The 
community assumed that TVC failures would result in the greatest deviation from the nominal IP. 
However, the study discussed in Appendix E revealed that due to the reduced thrust from a 
nozzle joint 1 failure, these failures fell behind and therefore had the greatest distance from the 
nominal IP. Due to time constraints, specifically to determine the failure cases that needed to be 
included in the run matrix, neither the comparison to other failure modes (other than TVC modes) 
or the investigation of failure modes current populating the composite turn table could be 
performed. 
ANALYSIS GOALS AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis had the following goals: 
1. Find the TVC failure at each time of failure (TOF) that produces the largest throw 
distance relative to the nominal IIP after 4 seconds in the malfunction turn. Note: 
The time of TOF+4 sec, selected by the Range, is the time at which turn angles 
from the composite turn angle table are used for Range products. 
2. Incorporate the maximum throw TVC failure scenario for each TOF into FFDP 
Malfunction Turn run matrix. 
JSC’s ANTARES simulation configured for Ares I-X analysis was used for this analysis.  
 
To determine the failure mode and conditions at each failure time that results in the 
greatest throw distance from the nominal trajectory at four seconds into the MT the following 
process was followed: 
• Single Rock and Tilt actuator failures (SAF) 
– Complete a parametric TVC deflection sweep on individual axis (rock or tilt) from -5 
deg to +5 deg in 0.05 deg increments for each TOF. 
• 0.05 deg resolution selected due to GNC error margins. 
– Find the distance of each MT trajectory IIP from the nominal trajectory IIP at TOF+4. 
– For each TOF find the maximum distance from the nominal trajectory IIP for all SAFs. 
• Dual Actuator Failures (DAF) 
– Complete a parametric* TVC deflection sweep on both axes (rock and tilt) from -5 
deg to +5 deg in 0.5 deg increments for each TOF 
• The increments were limited to 0.5 degrees because a parametric sweep of 
0.05 deg would require more than 2 million sim runs  
– Pull greatest four distances from nominal. Run parametric sweep around each out to 
the adjacent points in increments of 0.05 deg. 
  
 
• Assumption: After manual inspection of data, four points was determined 
to be a sufficient sampling to find the true maximum throw distance. 
• Final Maximum Throw Distance for each TOF for all TVC failures 
– Pull maximum of tilt, rock, and DAF maximums at each TOF to create final list of max 
throw distance after 4sec in malfunction turn. 
RESULTS 
Of all SAF and DAF scenarios, DAF failures had the greatest IIP deviation from the 
nominal trajectory after 4 seconds in the malfunction turn. Table 6 shows the TVC actuator 
deflections, IIP location, and greatest distance from the IIP for each failure time. The failure mode 
configurations in Table 6 were included in the MT run matrix. 
Table 6 TVC Failure Maximum Throw at TOF+4sec for Each TOF 
TOF (sec) Range from Nom (nmi) Rock (deg) Tilt (deg) Longitude (deg) Latitude (deg)
0 0.030385 5 5 279.38 28.627
2 0.071416 -5 -5 279.38 28.627
4 0.10392 -5 -5 279.38 28.627
6 0.14955 -5 -5 279.38 28.627
8 0.22309 -5 -5 279.38 28.628
10 0.26758 -5 -5 279.38 28.628
12 0.32509 -5 -5 279.38 28.628
14 0.37138 -5 -5 279.38 28.628
16 0.48948 -5 -5 279.39 28.627
18 0.69566 -4.25 -5 279.39 28.627
20 0.7196 -3.95 -5 279.4 28.625
22 0.7441 -3.7 -4.75 279.41 28.623
24 0.78381 -2.9 -4.85 279.42 28.622
26 0.82402 2.15 -5 279.43 28.63
28 0.8594 -0.8 -5 279.44 28.622
30 0.89612 -1.2 -4.65 279.46 28.619
32 0.93309 -0.8 -4.55 279.48 28.619
34 0.93394 -1.3 -4.1 279.5 28.618
36 0.89849 -1.5 -3.6 279.52 28.618
38 0.91769 -1.3 -3.5 279.54 28.619
40 0.97075 3.75 1 279.57 28.645
42 1.0308 -1.25 -3.35 279.59 28.619
44 1.0748 -1.45 -3.15 279.62 28.618
46 1.1215 -1.65 -3 279.65 28.618
48 1.175 -1.75 -2.9 279.68 28.617
50 1.2501 3.2 1.3 279.71 28.653
52 1.3464 2.8 1.8 279.75 28.656
54 1.4428 2.75 1.65 279.79 28.657
56 1.5321 2.65 1.6 279.83 28.659
58 1.6513 2.5 1.7 279.88 28.662
60 1.7859 2.45 1.7 279.93 28.664
62 1.956 -1.65 -2 279.98 28.61
64 2.1463 -1.65 -2.1 280.04 28.609
66 2.3713 2.35 1.85 280.1 28.675
68 2.6236 2.45 1.85 280.16 28.679
70 2.9012 -2.2 -2 280.23 28.602
72 3.2083 2.2 2.45 280.3 28.687
74 3.5379 -2.5 -2.1 280.38 28.598
76 3.8146 -2.9 -1.85 280.46 28.598
78 4.0206 1.9 3.15 280.54 28.695
80 4.2517 1.85 3.35 280.63 28.697
82 4.5033 1.6 3.7 280.71 28.697
84 4.7487 0.65 4.2 280.79 28.691
86 5.0274 -4.5 0.7 280.88 28.618
88 5.4618 -3.85 2.8 280.96 28.642
90 5.9372 -3.25 3.8 281.05 28.655
92 6.3528 -2.75 4.5 281.14 28.665
94 6.7333 -3.55 4.25 281.23 28.658
96 6.8322 -3.4 4.45 281.33 28.661
98 6.8865 -4.1 4 281.43 28.653
100 8.235 -5 5 281.5 28.654
102 8.0784 -5 5 281.6 28.655
104 7.8551 -5 5 281.7 28.655
106 6.8707 -5 5 281.8 28.655
108 4.5997 -5 5 281.9 28.656
110 2.2872 -5 5 281.98 28.656
112 0.98124 -5 5 282.02 28.655
114 0.34115 -5 5 282.05 28.655
116 0.065327 -5 5 282.06 28.655
118 0.022279 5 -5 282.06 28.654
120 0.01669 5 -5 282.06 28.654  
  
 
This analysis showed that hardover failure scenarios, for both DAFs and SAFs produced 
the greatest throw distances at four seconds into the turn (as shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35) , 
unless the trajectory resulted in a breakup prior to 4 seconds, as witnessed in the high-Q region, 
(as shown in Figure 36). Please note, the figures included here are for reference only. The 
analysis was rerun in late February due to a simulation model update (inclusion of the fly away 
maneuver), but the figures were not regenerated. In the figures below, please make note of the 
following: 
• SAF TVC Deflection Angle vs. Throw Distance from Nominal at TOF+4sec 
 Each point is one MT run with the indicated TVC deflection  
• DAF TVC Deflection Angle vs. Throw Distance from Nominal at TOF+4sec 
 Each red point is one MT run with the indicated rock and tilt deflection. The 
group is the 0.5 deg increment sweep. 
 Each black point is one MT run at the finer 0.05 deg increment sweep. 
 The black star with red outline is the 0.5 deg increment sweep maximum 
throw distance. 
 The white star with blue outline is the 0.05 deg increment sweep maximum 
throw distance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
s 
mentioned in the Procedures, once it was determined that the DAFs would result in a greater 
throw distance the four actuator configuration points resulting in the greatest throw distance were 
selected and a parametric sweep was run 
around each point out to the adjacent points in 
increments of 0.05 degrees. It was assumed 
that the greatest throw distance would be near 
one of the four greatest throw distances from 
the coarse parametric run. As Figure 34, 
demonstrates inspection of the DAF data run 
at 0.05 deg increments greatest throw distance 
from coarse sweep is within hundreds of feet if 
not the same point as found in the 0.5 deg 
increment sweep. 
In addition to the above figures, figures 
of present position were generated for better 
visualization of the TVC failure trajectories 
relative to the nominal trajectory. These are 
representations of the resulting trajectories if 
Figure 35 Rock Actuator Failure Trajectory 
IIP Range from Nominal IIP vs. Rock 
Actuator Deflection Angle at 
TOF+4seconds, TOF = 10 seconds 
Figure 34 DAF Trajectory IIP Range from 
Nominal IIP vs. Actuator Deflection at 
TOF+4seconds, TOF=10 seconds 
Figure 36 Rock Actuator Failure Trajectory IIP 
Range from Nominal IIP vs. Rock Actuator 
Deflection Angle at TOF+4seconds, TOF = 52 
seconds 
  
 
Figure 37 SAF IIP Latitude vs. Longitude, TOF = 52 seconds 
the vehicle was allowed to fly out to the end of the stage or breakup. Realistically, the vehicle 
would not be allowed to fly a long malfunctioning trajectory. Note the following regarding the SAF 
IIP Latitude vs. Longitude and DAF Latitude and Longitude vs. Altitude Present Position and IIP 
Track figures below: 
• The nominal trajectory is only shown out to the longest MT run.  
• All MTs are shown as long as they fly (either out to break up or the end of first stage) 
• The nominal trajectory is represented by thick black line 
• MTs are represented by colored lines 
• A single black asterisk indicates the time of failure 
• A single green star shows the location on the 
nominal trajectory at TOF+4 
• Blue asterisks indicate TOF+4 on MTs 
• Single red star shows location on trajectory of the 
furthest distance 
from nominal at TOF+4 sec 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
This analysis identified that of 
the TVC failures DAFs resulted 
in the greatest throw distance 
from the nominal IIP. The TVC 
deflection combination that 
resulted in the greatest IIP throw 
distance for each failure time 
was captured and the 61 cases 
were added to the MT run matrix. Although there are 62 time steps in the MT analysis only 61 
were included because the last step occurs at staging. These were then included with the entire 
run matrix and used in the population of the 
Composite Turn Angle Table. However, the 
trajectory time history data were not delivered, 
per the request of the 45SW, because they 
were forced failures, not ones believed to 
actually be capable of occurring. Additionally, it 
should be noted that these cases were selected 
by the one that produced the greatest throw 
distance not the greatest turn angle as is used 
to populate the composite turn angle table. 
However, further investigation of the composite 
turn angle table showed that none of these 
“optimized” trajectories populated the table 
whether it was generated using the maximum 
turn angle or the maximum throw distance (See 
Appendix E). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 DAF Latitude and Longitude vs. 
Altitude Present Position and IIP Track,  
TOF = 52 seconds 
 
  
 
APPENDIX E  COMPOSITE TURN ANGLE TABLE COMPARISON 
INTRODUCTION 
The 45SW uses the Ares I-X malfunction turn composite turn angle table, part of the Ares 
I-X Final Flight Data Package (FFDP), for risk calculations and to create destruct criteria for the 
vehicle. The table provided by NASA in a dry run delivery to the 45SW gave the maximum turn 
angles at failure times ranging from 0s to 122s Mission Elapsed Time (MET) in two second 
increments, and at every second from 0s to 12s into the malfunction turn. The turn angle was 
measured as the angle between the velocity vectors of the nominal and malfunction turn 
trajectories. For their analysis, the 45SW expected the turn angle table to be populated by the 
turn angles resulting from the malfunction cases with the maximum throw distance from the 
nominal trajectory at each second in the malfunction turn. The following analysis was conducted 
to compare the two methods for generating the composite turn angle table. 
PROCESS 
The purpose of this analysis was to perform a comparison between the composite turn 
angle table created using the maximum throw distances to that generated using the maximum 
turn angle. The FFDP malfunction turn trajectory data generated by LaRC was used to perform 
this analysis, the turn angle is calculated as the angle between the velocity vector of the 
malfunction and nominal trajectories. The throw distance for each malfunction trajectory was 
determined using Matlab’s distance() function and a Great Circle approximation. For each time of 
failure, the trajectory responsible for the maximum throw distance was determined at each time 
step in the malfunction turn and the turn angle and velocity magnitude was recorded.   
A spreadsheet was created to display the turn angle, velocity magnitude, and throw 
distance by both time of failure and time in turn. Also included in the spreadsheet was a 
description of the malfunction trajectory (the file name) that caused the maximum throw distance 
from the nominal. These files were color-coded by failure type to better visualize the failure 
modes responsible for each entry in the table. 
ANALYSIS 
For the purposes of this analysis, all malfunction data with a failure time of 0s was 
neglected, as well as any data recorded at the instant the malfunction occurred, or zero seconds 
into the malfunction turn. Since at these times all the malfunction data has a very small 
magnitude, any percent differences are very large, giving the incorrect impression that there is a 
large difference between the data collected at maximum turn angles and that calculated from the 
trajectory yielding the maximum throw distance. For this reason, the malfunction data at these 
times was not considered for validation of the calculation method or for comparison between the 
maximum turn angle and maximum throw distance tables. 
 
VALIDATING FUNCTION OUTPUT 
The algorithm used to calculate the turn angle and throw distance of a malfunction 
trajectory and populate the turn angle table was verified by recreating the maximum turn angle 
table and comparing it, using a ±0.1⁰ comparison criteria, to the FFDP composite turn angle 
table.  From an earlier analysis, the LCSRP TWG has already accepted a ±0.1⁰ agreement for 
verification of the FFDP turn angle table. Since the maximum turn angle table created matched 
the FFDP data within this tolerance, the algorithm was accepted. To validate the table created 
with the maximum throw distances, it was confirmed that no angle generated by the maximum 
throw distance trajectory was greater than its corresponding entry in the maximum turn angle 
table. Also, the entries in the max throw distance table are expected to be fairly close to the 
maximum angle data. This is especially true early into the malfunction turn, when the vehicle has 
  
 
not had much time to propagate along the malfunction trajectory, so any differences between the 
maximum turn angle and maximum throw distance trajectories should still be small. From this it 
was assumed that, on average, the entries in the max throw distance table should be within 20⁰ 
of the maximum angle data.  
With the tolerance of ±0.1⁰, no values in the maximum throw distance table are greater 
than the values in the maximum angle table. On average the difference in the two tables is about 
2.13⁰, and only a few sporadic entries have a difference larger than 20⁰. Therefore, the algorithm 
was accepted and used to create tables of failure type, turn angle, malfunction velocity 
magnitude, and throw distance data for both the maximum turn angle and maximum throw 
distance failures, which were compared in this analysis.  
 
MAX THROW TABLE ANALYSIS 
The turn angles in the maximum throw distance table generally increase with time in turn, 
with some fluctuation. The occurrence of a failure prevents the vehicle from being able to 
maintain a nominal trajectory, so its deviation from the nominal continues to grow as the vehicle 
spends more time in the malfunction turn. Malfunction turn angles also generally decrease with 
an increasing time of failure. Later in flight, as momentum builds up along the nominal trajectory, 
it becomes more and more difficult for the vehicle to alter its direction, so the angles between the 
nominal and malfunction velocity vectors remain small.   
Like malfunction velocity, the maximum throw distances from the nominal trajectory 
increase with both failure time and time in turn before reaching their maximum values between 
failure times of 96s – 106s MET. After this point the throw distances start decreasing with 
increasing time of failure. Similar to the maximum malfunction turn angles, momentum affects the 
magnitude of the malfunction throw distances. At later failure times, after a large amount of 
momentum has built up along the nominal direction, it is more difficult to obtain a large throw 
distance.  
As seen in Figure 39, the failure modes responsible for the maximum throw distance from 
the nominal trajectory form a rough pattern. The Joint 1 failure mode is responsible for most of 
the early failures, and the dual actuator failures start to populate the table with failures occurring 
mid-first stage (30s – 90s MET) at 5s into the malfunction turn. Later in the turn, dual actuator 
failure modes begin to populate earlier and later failure times, as well. Eventually the Joint 1 
failure mode reappears 9s – 12s into the malfunction turn for the mid-first stage failures, creating 
a curving pattern. This pattern is symmetric by failure time, with early times of failure experiencing 
the same failure modes as the later failures. The “<”-like pattern across the amount of time spent 
in the malfunction turn is caused by the breakup of the maximum throw distance trajectories. The 
more harshly oriented Joint 1 failures that are responsible for the maximum throw distances early 
into the malfunction turn begin to break up at five seconds time in turn. After that time, the TVC 
actuator failure modes begin to populate the maximum throw distance tables. The failures in the 
middle of the table, those with failure times between 30s and 90s MET, break up first at five 
seconds into the malfunction turn and the earlier and later failure times gradually follow, causing 
the pointed pattern. The same thing happens around nine seconds into the malfunction turn, and 
again at ten seconds. The TVC actuator failures with the largest rock and tilt deflections, the ones 
responsible for the maximum throw distance from the nominal IIP in the middle of the table – 
between 54s and 66s MET – start to break up. They are replaced with the Joint 1 failure 
trajectories that have not yet experienced a break up – the failures with no rock or tilt deflection. 
At ten seconds into the malfunction turn, these cases also start to break up, and are replaced with 
the smaller deflection TVC actuator failure trajectories. This constant trajectory breakup is 
responsible for the layered, pointed pattern that is apparent in the table of failure types 
responsible for the maximum throw distance from the nominal. 
To formulate their destruct criteria, the 45SW considers malfunction data at four seconds 
time in turn. To get the most conservative data at this time, the 45SW requested an optimized 
trajectory for each time of failure be added to the malfunction turn run matrix to yield the greatest 
  
 
throw distance at four seconds into the malfunction turn. For the analysis, it was assumed that a 
loss of thrust vector control (TVC) would yield the greatest throw distance of all malfunction turn 
failure modes (See Appendix E). The four seconds time in turn optimized trajectories were 
included in the composite turn angle table analysis. However, after completing the composite turn 
table generated with maximum throw distance the Joint 1 failure mode populated the table at four 
seconds time in turn for all failure times. This was confirmed by plotting the Joint 1, optimized, 
and nominal IIPs at each time step. From this, it was apparent that while the optimized cases 
generally had more crossrange from the nominal than the nozzle failures, the Joint 1 cases 
actually had greater throw distance from the nominal because they were much farther up range 
than either the nominal or optimized failures. This is due to the reduced thrust associated with the 
Joint 1 failure mode. See “Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range Safety Analysis” for additional 
information on malfunction turn failure modes
2
. For this reason, Joint 1 failures are responsible for 
the vast majority of max throw distance failures until about five seconds into the malfunction 
turns. After five seconds into the turn, crossrange-generating failure modes, like dual actuator 
failures, begin to build up enough energy to produce the necessary crossrange to surpass the 
Joint 1 failures as the maximum throw distances failure modes. At the same time the Joint 1 
failures with the largest rock and tilt deflections, which are also responsible for the maximum 
throw distances from the nominal between 30s and 90s MET, begin to break up. At that point, 
dual actuator lock-in-place failures produce the most maximum throw distances cases, followed 
by software dual actuator hard over failures. Other failure modes appear throughout the table, but 
most maximum throw distance failure cases are due to either TVC actuator failures, including 
dual, single, and the optimized dual hard over failures, or Joint 1 nozzle failures. The largest 
throw distance from the nominal trajectory is the result of a Joint 1 nozzle failure, and in general 
the largest throw distances from 1s to 12s into the malfunction turn are due to the Joint 1 failure 
mode, as well. 
 
MAX THROW AND MAX TURN ANGLE TABLES COMPARISON  
To determine whether or not the maximum throw distance data could be reasonably 
represented by the maximum turn angle data, the output of the two methods were compared. 
Since some of the angles in the turn tables are very small in magnitude, a large percentage 
difference may be the result of a small turn angle as opposed to a large discrepancy between the 
maximum angle and the angle resulting from the maximum throw distance trajectory. Also, if the 
malfunction turn angles have larger magnitudes, a big difference in their values may not indicate 
a significant difference in size from a percentage perspective. Therefore, both the magnitude and 
percent difference between the two angle tables was compared. If the percent difference between 
the angles was greater than 10%, and the angle difference between them was greater than five 
degrees, the difference was considered significant. Although there were 85 violations (~12.3%) of 
both of these requirements, none of the violations populated the four seconds time in turn 
column. In fact, the average difference between the two angles at 4s into the malfunction turn 
was 1.08⁰.  
The difference in the velocities of the maximum throw distance and maximum turn angle 
methods was considered large if greater than 20 ft/s. Many of the maximum throw distance table 
entries violated this limit, all occurring four seconds into the malfunction turn or later. At 4s into 
the malfunction turn, there were 12 velocity magnitude violations in the 59 failure times 
considered. However, the velocities with the maximum throw distances at four seconds after the 
malfunction were all less than the velocities from the trajectories with the maximum turn angles 
from the nominal, making the velocities in the maximum angle table more conservative. 
While there were many entries in the maximum throw distance table that were greater 
than the throw distances from the trajectories resulting in the maximum turn angles, their average 
difference four seconds into the malfunction turn was about 1.2 nautical miles. The throw 
distances resulting in the maximum turn angle were within five nautical miles of the maximum 
throw distance at four seconds into the turn for all failure times, with only a couple table entries 
within 0.5 nautical miles of this value. 
  
 
Even though the two tables were populated using two different methods, the patterns of 
failure types responsible for both the maximum throw distance and the maximum turn angle were 
almost identical. As can be seen in Figure 39 and Figure 40 on the following two pages, there are 
small differences throughout the tables, but the same trends are easily noticed, suggesting that 
the failures resulting in the maximum throw distance from the nominal trajectory are similar to 
those causing the maximum turn angle from the nominal.  
While the failure types causing the maximum throw distance and angle are very similar, 
rarely did the same failure cause both characteristics. Many times the two failures causing the 
maximum throw and angle would be the same type, but with different rock and tilt orientations.  
CONCLUSION 
Since the 45SW considers only the data from four seconds into the malfunction turn at 
each time of failure, it appears that the maximum throw distance malfunction data can be 
reasonably represented by the data from the malfunctions generating the maximum malfunction 
turn angle. Although there are differences between the composite turn angle table generated with 
the maximum throw distance and the table populated with the maximum turn angle table 
delivered in the FFDP, the major discrepancies occur at five seconds into the malfunction turns or 
later. Four seconds into the malfunction turns, no failure times showed an angle difference 
greater than five degrees between the maximum turn angle and the malfunction turn angle 
causing the maximum throw distance from the nominal trajectory. There were some significant 
differences in the magnitude of the malfunction velocities between the two methods four seconds 
into the malfunction turn, but the velocities from the maximum turn angle failures were all greater 
than the velocities caused by the maximum throw distance cases. Therefore, the 45SW was 
provided with the most conservative malfunction velocity data. Finally, none of the maximum 
throw distances were more than five nautical miles greater than the throw distances causing the 
maximum turn angles at four seconds into the malfunction turns.  
As the time spent in the malfunction turn increases, the differences in the maximum angle 
tables and maximum throw tables become significant.  However, as long as the 45SW uses only 
the four seconds time in turn data to create their destruct criteria, there are no concerns with the 
delivered FFDP composite turn angle table. Through this analysis, the processes to create both 
the maximum malfunction turn angle tables and the maximum throw distance tables for Ares 1-X 
have been validated and documented.  
  
 
Figure 39 Max Throw Failure Modes 
  
 
 
Figure 40 Max Turn Angle Failure Mode 
